Knowledge and innovative entrepreneurship - social capital and individual capacities by Cantner, Uwe & Stuetzer, Michael
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Knowledge and innovative
entrepreneurship - social capital and
individual capacities
Uwe Cantner and Stuetzer Michael
Friedrich Schiller University Jena, University of Southern Denmark,




MPRA Paper No. 52482, posted 26. December 2013 21:33 UTC
Cantner, Uwe, & Stuetzer, Michael (2013), Knowledge and innovative entrepreneurship - 
social capital and individual capacities, in: Morone P. (Ed), Knowledge, Innovation and 
Internationalization, Essays in Honour of Cesare Imbriani (pp.59-90), Routledge. NY. 
 
Link to electronic copy of the book: 
http://www.routledge.com/books/details/9780415693110/ 
 
Knowledge and innovative entrepreneurship - social capital and 
individual capacities 
Uwe Cantnera,b and Michael Stuetzer c,d 
 
aDepartment of Economics and Business Administration, DFG RTG 1411 “The Economics 
of Innovative Change”, Friedrich Schiller University Jena, 07743 Jena, Germany 
bDepartment of Marketing and Management, University of Southern Denmark, DK-5230 
Odense M, Denmark 
cIlmenau University of Technology, Chair of Economic Policy, Ehrenbergstr. 29, 98684 
Ilmenau.  
dAustralian Centre for Entrepreneurship Research, Queensland University of Technology, 





A central development within the management literature has been the growth of nascent 
entrepreneur research analysing on--going venture start-up efforts and/or firms in gestation 
over time (Davidsson, 2006). New ventures have an important effect on economic 
development. They are credited for the transfer of innovations into the market (Schumpeter, 
1934; Acs and Plummer; 2005) and creating regional employment (e.g. Fritsch and 
Mueller, 2004).  
Central questions in nascent entrepreneurship research concern the characteristics of the 
venture creation process and the factors affecting performance of these firms (for an 
overview see Davidsson, 2006). Among other factors considered in the literature, the social 
embeddedness of the entrepreneur has been found to play a pivotal role (Davidsson and 
Honig, 2003). Social capital enables entrepreneurs to access resources (Florin et al., 2003) 
or novel information (Uzzi, 1997) in order to create opportunities (Baker and Nelson, 
2005). During the venture creation process, most firms suffer from substantial resource 
constraints (Shepherd et al., 2000) and use their personal networks as a means to access 
resources and information far below market price (Elfring and Hulsink, 2003).  
However, a sizeable gap exists in the burgeoning social capital literature on the subject of 
team start--ups. A most prominent finding is that team start--ups are more successful than 
solo start--ups (e.g. Lechler, 2001). One of the offered explanations is that entrepreneurs 
can combine their abilities and financial capital in a team, giving them an advantage above 
solo entrepreneurs (e.g. Gartner, 1985; Stam and Schutjens, 2006). Sometimes explicitly 
(e.g. Colombo and Grilli, 2005; Stam and Schutjens, 2006) but more often implicitly (e.g. 
Davidsson and Honig, 2003; van Gelderen et al., 2005), the same argument is applied to the 
usage of social capital, i.e. that the social capital from individual team members is 
combined to provide an advantage for teams over solo entrepreneurs. As yet, to our 
knowledge, no study has explicitly analysed whether, compared to solo entrepreneurs, more 
social capital is found within teams and whether this leads to their better performance.  
In this chapter, we approach these two questions and empirically explore the use of social 
capital of solo entrepreneurs and entrepreneurial teams during the venture creation process. 
In doing so, we refine the empirical concept of social capital in that we do not look at its 
mere existence but focus on its use in terms of concrete support (e.g. advice on the business 
plan, marketing, or research and development - R&D) for the entrepreneurs. We address 
two major research questions. The first concerns the differential use of social capital. Do 
solo entrepreneurs rely more often on social capital than new venture teams, or is it the 
other way around? How do both types of start--ups use social capital? More precisely, we 
investigate the relationship between social capital and other characteristics of the new 
venture and its founders (e.g. human capital). The second research question then turns to 
the effect of social capital on subsequent new venture performance. Appropriate hypotheses 
in this study are tested using a dataset of 456 start--ups in innovative industries in the 
German state of Thuringia.  
The reminder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the theory and 
previous research on social capital in order to generate six testable hypotheses. In Section 3, 
we describe the dataset and the methods employed to measure the use of social capital. We 
then present (Section 4) the results of our analysis. The chapter concludes in Section 5, 
where we interpret and discuss the results and draw some conclusions. 
 
 
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
2.1 New Firm Creation and Social Capital 
 Creating a new firm, in comparison to being employed, involves high levels of risk and 
uncertainty (Lumpkin and Dess, 2001). Entrepreneurs may consider alleviating the effects 
of risk and uncertainty by approaching others for help and advice, broadly captured by the 
concept of social capital. While there are various definitions of social capital in the 
literature (for an overview see Adler and Kwon, 2002) we follow the integrative approach 
of Nahapiet and Goshal (1998). They define social capital at the individual level ‘as the 
sum of the actual and potential resources embedded within, available through and derived 
from the network of relationships possessed by an individual or a social unit’ (Nahapiet and 
Goshal, 1998, p. 243). Social capital is multidimensional, encompassing a structural, a 
relational and a cognitive dimension (Nahapiet and Goshal, 1998). While the structural 
dimension is concerned about the properties of the social network such as the density and 
the connectivity among actors (Burt, 1992), the relational aspect of social capital refers to 
the quality and kind of interpersonal relationships (Granovetter, 1992). The cognitive 
dimension of social capital captures shared representations and systems of meaning that 
individuals have with one another. Another distinction in social capital literature is that 
between bridging and bonding social capital (Putnam, 2000). Bridging social capital refers 
to links between individuals and organizations representing different expertise, views of the 
world and cultural habits (e.g. Samuelsson and Davidsson, 2009). In contrast, bonding 
social capital refers to the positive (but sometimes also negative) effects of cohesion and 
trust between actors enabling collective actions (Putnam, 2000). In a closely related 
classification of social capital, theorists distinguish between weak and strong ties 
(Granovetter, 1973). Here, weak ties describe loose relationships to actors providing non--
redundant information (e.g. Davidsson and Honig, 2003) whereas strong ties refer to close 
relations to a limited set of actors featuring trust and its positive by--products (e.g. 
Samuelsson and Davidsson, 2009).  
Using the definition of Nahapiet and Goshal (1998) as a starting point, different 
implications arise for solo and team--started ventures. We return to that point immediately 
after the introduction of the concept of new venture teams. We define a venture as a team 
start--up where more than one person is actively involved in the venture creation process 
and where these persons own or had owned a part of the venture (Kamm et al., 1990). As to 
mastering the venture creation process, the superiority of team start--ups compared to solo 
start--ups is one result readily acknowledged in entrepreneurship research (e.g. Cooper and 
Bruno, 1977; Lechler, 2001). In particular, for high technology firms (the sample of 
interest), there is a higher requirement of skills, making team start--up a necessity. Gartner 
(1985, p. 703) argues that ‘individuals combine their abilities in teams in order to start an 
organization successfully’. Hence, the advantage of a team lies in the bundling of human 
and financial capital (Stam and Schutjens, 2006).  
Upon initial investigation, the argument of bundling human and financial capital can also 
be applied to a solo entrepreneur’s use of social capital, considered as the ability of an actor 
to mobilize useful resources from his social network (Bourdieu, 1986; Burt, 1992; 
Coleman, 1988). Teams combine and integrate the social capital of their members, possibly 
providing them with an advantage above solo entrepreneurs (Davidsson and Honig, 2003). 
As yet, to our knowledge, little is known whether, compared to solo entrepreneurs, more 
social capital is found within teams and whether this leads to their superior performance. 
Comparing venture teams and solo entrepreneurs with respect to the structural dimension of 
social capital, the former may have an advantage through broader access to critical 
resources through their larger number of contacts within their social network. The decision 
to create a venture team or to add an additional team member has the potential to increase 
the social capital base of the start--up and, as a result, may improve the resource profile of 
the new venture, leading to increased new venture persistence and success. Implicitly, this 
argument is made in a considerable number of studies, as belonging to a start--up team is 
considered to be an indicator of social capital (e.g. Colombo and Grilli, 2005; Davidsson 
and Honig, 2003; van Gelderen et al., 2005).  
Looking at the relational dimension of social capital, a contrary argument can be put 
forward. While a positive correlation may exist between team size and the possible access 
to resources via entrepreneurs’ contacts, the actual use of those contacts may not be 
correlated with team size. Compared to a solo entrepreneur, a new venture team can 
complete more venture creation activities in--house through combining (often different) 
skills from its members (Gartner, 1985). The actual use of social capital may thus decrease.  
In our empirical analysis, we explore whether the mere use of social capital differs between 
solo and team start--ups. With respect to the team start--ups, the two counteracting 
arguments are to be considered: First, the strengthening and broadening of the social 
network in a team increases (ceteris paribus) the likelihood of using social capital. Second, 
the ability of a team to perform more tasks on its own decreases the likelihood of using 
social capital. Both effects work in opposite directions concerning the use of social capital. 
With due care, we therefore test whether the use of social capital differs at all between the 
two types of venture founding by the following hypothesis: 
 
H1: Solo entrepreneurs and entrepreneurial teams differ regarding their respective use of 
social capital in the venture creation process. 
 
2.2 The Effects of Social Capital 
 
A further focus of our analysis is the differential effect of social capital use venture 
performance between solo entrepreneurs and new venture teams. Given the nature of the 
dataset consisting of start--ups in innovative industries, we assess the literature concerning 
social capital of tech--based as well as knowledge--based start--ups. The review of that 
literature reveals that social capital influences the venture creation process via three 
different channels. It 1) assists (nascent) entrepreneurs in accessing resources, 2) provides 
trusted feedback to the entrepreneurs and 3) provides access to novel information.  
Access to resources is of critical importance to small and young companies in innovative 
industries which traditionally suffer from a range of resource constraints including financial 
capital, a skilled workforce, or equipment necessary for R&D and production (Aldrich and 
Martinez, 2001), which are critical for growth. Anderson et al. (2007) analyse ten 
technology companies in Aberdeen and find evidence that the use entrepreneurs’ contacts 
with former business partners supporting them in recruiting their work--force. Much more 
work has been done in studying the relationship between social capital and the financing of 
start--ups. Shane and Cable (2002) argue that via network ties potential investors were able 
to screen and to evaluate the entrepreneurs and their business ideas, which was the basis of 
the investment decision. Florin et al. (2003) reports for a sample of US firms seeking to 
float on the stock exchange that the level of social capital is positively and significantly 
related to the level of attracted funds and return on sales. However, this result could only be 
partially confirmed by Honig et al. (2006), who find some evidence for a relationship 
between social capital and the amount of sales, but no links between social capital and 
financial capital.  
Furthermore, social capital affects growth aspirations among nascent entrepreneurs (Liao 
and Welsch, 2003), which is considered a precursor of subsequent venture growth (Baum et 
al., 2001). Using a sample of Swedish technascent entrepreneurs, Samuelsson and 
Davidsson (2009) find that projects which extensively use social capital significantly make 
progress in the venture creation process. Taken together, we propose the hypothesis: 
H2: Social capital in the venture creation process has a positive impact on later new venture 
performance. 
 
Trusted feedback is the second transfer channel of social capital. Its theoretical foundations 
lie in the relational dimension of social capital (Nahapiet and Goshal, 1998), which deals 
with the quality or the kind of ties an actor possesses (Granovetter, 1990). Within the 
relational aspect of social capital, tie strength has attracted great interest in the research 
community. Although it is a simplification of Granovetter’s (1973) original argument that 
tie strength is a continuum, ties are typically categorized as being either weak or strong. 
Thereby, Granovetter characterizes strong ties in contrast to weak ties by a combination of 
high emotional intensity and intimacy, much time spent with the network contact, and high 
reciprocity of services.  
The strength of strong ties lies in the high level of trust between the network members. It is 
well known that networks with a high proportion of strong ties are “dense” networks (Burt, 
2000), which indicates that many network members are directly connected to each other. 
Scholars highlight the importance of trusted feedback and the transfer of tacit knowledge 
(Aldrich and Martinez, 2001) for entrepreneurs stemming from such networks as necessary 
components of entrepreneurial learning (Zahra et al., 2006). Thereby we understand 
learning as the process of accumulating the knowledge required for being effective in 
starting up and managing new ventures (Politis, 2005).  
Learning takes place throughout the venture creation process. Bhave (1994) was one of the 
first researchers to recognize the complex nature of the venture creation process, which he 
described as nonlinear and iterative. Key features of his model are feedback loops between 
the different stages of venture creation, allowing for changes in the business concept after 
receiving corresponding feedback and information from, for example, customers and 
financiers. Other scholars also emphasize the importance of learning and adapting in the 
venture creation process (Aldrich and Ruef, 2006; Ronstadt, 1988; Shane and 
Venkataraman, 2000) for the development of routines and capabilities (Zahra et al., 2006) 
to run a business successfully (Teece et al., 1997).  
A well--known example of the benefits of learning from strong ties is the study from 
Elfring and Hulsink (2003). They report that high--tech start--ups benefit from trusted 
feedback of their strong ties to better recognize opportunities. Studying 23 cases in New 
York’s apparel industry, Uzzi (1997) finds that companies profit from information transfer 
on strategies, prices and products from a dense network which enables them to take 
advantage of fast--changing market opportunities. However, Uzzi (1997) acknowledges 
serious drawbacks in relying solely on strong ties and high--density networks. It is argued 
that information and ideas coming from too densely connected networks lack newness. 
Entrepreneurs, who receive information only from inside such insulated networks may 
experience below--average performance. This disadvantage is of particular importance for 
high--tech start--up projects with innovative products (as shown by Presutti et al., 2007), as 
they operate within global markets and require greater diversity in ideas, information and 
feedback concerning the business idea in line with greater complexity and requirements of 
their numerous international markets. In evaluating these mixed findings on the effects of 
strong ties and dense networks on entrepreneurial performance, we still postulate the 
following hypothesis: 
 
H3: Strong ties in the venture creation process have a positive impact on later new venture 
performance. 
 
Access to novel information - the third transfer channel - is beneficial for entrepreneurs 
because ventures in gestation often do not possess information about relevant facets of 
business, for example prices, production processes, inputs, and competition (Aldrich and 
Ruef, 2006) being critical requirements of the entrepreneurial learning described above 
(Zahra et al., 2006). This information is widely dispersed among individual actors within 
the market (customers and suppliers), as well as among people seemingly unrelated to the 
market (engineers, technicians, or financiers).  
In general, to access this dispersed information weak ties are considered important, because 
through them it is possible to reach distant subgroups of the network via a rather close 
network partner. In contrast to strong ties, which have a tendency for closure (Coleman, 
1988), weak ties can serve as bridges to indirect ties (Granovetter, 1973). Therefore, weak 
ties enlarge the network of an entrepreneur and provide the nascent entrepreneur with 
access to novel information which may assist in the discovery of more profitable business 
opportunities (e.g. Elfring and Hulsink, 2003), the development of products (Lechner and 
Dowling, 2003), the reduction of the cost of production (Yli--Renko et al., 2001), and the 
contacting potential investors (Shane and Cable, 2002). Therefore we hypothesise: 
 
H4: Weak ties in the venture creation process have a positive impact on later new venture 
performance. 
 
To access social capital in general and strong and weak ties in particular requires that the 
entrepreneur or the new venture team show an appropriate ability to do so. This leads to the 
concept of human capital. A number of empirical studies report that human capital 
variables (e.g. entrepreneurial experience, leadership experience or business experience) 
have positive significant effects on the progress of nascent entrepreneurs and subsequent 
venture success (e.g. Honig et al., 2006; Samuelsson and Davidsson, 2009). Being more 
specific in our discussion on the effects of social capital on venture performance, we argue 
that an entrepreneur or a new venture team learns more successfully if human capital aligns 
with social capital. More precisely, entrepreneurs with a pronounced human capital variety 
should have a higher level of “absorptive capacity” to tap a broad array of relevant 
information (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). With human capital variety, we refer mainly to 
an entrepreneur’s or a venture team’s breadth of experience over different functional 
activities. Following Hayton and Zahra (2005), we argue that, because of their broader 
experience, these entrepreneurs should be more able to rate new information on their 
usefulness, and incorporate this new information more easily into their existing knowledge 
stock.1 Furthermore, we suggest that entrepreneurs with higher human capital variety 
should have a larger social network to draw on, giving them broader choices and 
opportunities to select the most appropriate helpers within their networks. This latter 
argument is considered within the context of weak ties, because the strong tie network of an 
entrepreneur only consists of a very limited number of persons (Lechner and Dowling, 
2003).  
To the best of our knowledge, only the study by Batjargal (2007) on internet start--ups in 
China has yet examined the moderating effect of human capital on the linkage between 
social capital and venture success. Although the econometric findings are mixed, Batjargal 
(2007) concludes that the combined effect of human capital and social capital enhances the 
survival chances of newly founded businesses. We, therefore, propose the following 
hypotheses: 
 
H5: The relationship between social capital in the venture creation process and subsequent 
venture performance is stronger for solo entrepreneurs and entrepreneurial teams with a 
higher level of human capital variety, and 
H6: The relationship between weak ties in the venture creation process and subsequent 
venture performance is stronger for solo entrepreneurs and entrepreneurial teams with a 
higher level of human capital variety. 
                                                 
1 Principally, one could think of different human capital variables affecting the learning process. However, the 
approximation of human capital by the heterogeneity of the functional background of top management teams 
in high--tech ventures is suggested by Hayton and Zahra (2005), who argue that absorptive capacity of a new 
venture team is better measured with the breadth of the knowledge base rather than its depth (e.g. 
heterogeneity of functional background vs. the average number of years of leadership experience of the 
entrepreneurial team). 
  
3. DATASET AND METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Dataset and Interview Strategy 
 
For our empirical analysis, we use data from the “Thuringian Founder Study” - an 
interdisciplinary research project on success and failure of innovative start--ups. One part 
of this study is a dataset of innovative young firms. The unique dataset comprises the 
entries of private and commercial companies in the commercial register (Handelsregister) 
between the years 1994 and 2006 in the German state of Thuringia. This design made it 
possible to interview not only founders of active companies but also founders of ventures 
that had failed. The database is restricted to entries in innovative industries (Grupp et al., 
20002). The first registered owner--managers for each new entry form the survey 
population. From this population, a random sample of 2,604 start--ups was generated. From 
January to October 2008, the research team conducted 639 face--to--face interviews with 
the solo entrepreneur or the leading entrepreneur of a start--up team (response rate: 25 per 
cent). As some companies were not genuinely new but rather were subsidiaries or the result 
of a diversification of an existing company into a new business field, we removed 76 
companies from the sample. Thirteen companies were removed from the sample due to 
interview quality concerns. For this chapter, we restrict the analysis to observations within 
                                                 
2 Grupp et al. (2000) define innovativeness at the level of the industry. On average, companies in innovative 
industries spend more than 3.5 per cent of their turnover on research and development. 
the complete dataset and therefore drop 78 observations with missing values in one or more 
used variables. Furthermore, to avoid censoring, we dropped 16 observations which started 
later than 2005.3 Our empirical analysis evaluates the effect of social capital use in the 
venture creation process on subsequent venture performance in the third business year. The 
final sample consists of 456 companies, which can be further classified as 182 solo 
entrepreneurs and 274 new venture teams.  
The structured interviews were conducted by members of the research project and student 
research assistants who were trained in various sessions in December 2007. The research 
team used a retrospective design to collect the data. To overcome the bias of hindsight as 
well as memory decay (Davidsson, 2006), the research team adapted the ‘Life History 
Calendar’ tool from psychology in order to obtain information on the venture creation 
process. The Life History Calendar is a useful tool for constructing individual processes 
and developments (Caspi et al., 1996; Freedman et al., 1988). With it, one gains more 
reliable and valid retrospective information compared to traditional questionnaires (Belli et 
al., 2001). When the interview commenced, the participants together with the interviewer 
filled in major life events and sequences in the Life History Calendar (family life, working 
sequences, historical events, and important dates of the business history). During the 
interview, the Life History Calendar was visible to the participants. Before each 
retrospective item (e.g. team composition, human and social capital questions) was started, 
we asked the interviewee to look at the specific time point in the Life History Calendar and 
verbally recalled special events that took place during that time in order to better remember 
                                                 
3 Firms founded in 2006 cannot answer any question on their third year of business activity. 
that time. The interview strategy and the Life History Calendar are in line with the 
recommendation by Belli et al. (2004).  
The restriction of this study to the German state of Thuringia has the major advantage of 
reducing sample heterogeneity stemming from, for example, regional differences. This is of 
particular importance in Germany, where there are still pronounced differences in the 
determinants of new venture success between Eastern and Western Germany (Fritsch, 
2004).  
 
3.2 Dependent Variable 
 
Our dependent variable attempts to measure the performance of start--up firms. We 
approximate this by the absolute number of employees in the third year of operation of the 
firm. The solo entrepreneur, members of the new venture team as well a potential board of 
directors were in no cases counted as employees. As our sample consists only of new firms 
and does not include franchises or corporate ventures, the vast majority of firms have zero 
employees in the venture creation phase. For that reason, employment growth rates could 
not be computed (for a similar approach see Baum et al., 2000). If a new venture did not 
survive the third business year, the number of employees remained coded as zero. 
Traditional outcome variables such as firm value, profitability and turnover are not applied 
in this study for two reasons. First, the self--reported measure of sales turned out to be 
unreliable. While respondents could assess the amount of sales generated in the first three 
business years, monetary reform in Germany replacing the Deutschmark with the Euro in 
several steps between 1999 and 2001 made it difficult for the entrepreneurs to correctly 
attribute the sales to either currency. Second, secondary data from business information 
providers could not be used, because such databases tend to focus on larger and surviving 
firms, substantially reducing the overlap with the dataset.  
Nevertheless we checked the validity of the dependent variable. Two business information 
providers (Creditreform and Bureau van Dijk) made available data regarding employment 
growth in the first three business years for 66 start--ups in our data set. We found that our 
measure of number of employees and the corresponding information provided by 
Creditreform and Bureau van Dijk (2009) correlated highly (r = 0.78, p < 0.001). 
 
3.3 Independent Variables 
 
Our independent variables attempt to measure the actual use of social capital in the venture 
creation process, which comprises the time from the first concrete steps into the venture 
creation process until the start of the first business year.4  
Typically, researchers use the name generator or the position generator in social capital 
measurement. The name generator (McCallister and Fischer, 1978) maps the ego--centred 
social network of an entrepreneur comprising persons who were most helpful in 
establishing and running an entrepreneur’s new venture. However, the name generator has a 
tendency to focus on strong ties (van der Gaag and Snijders, 2004). Therefore, we opted 
against this method. 
                                                 
4 The first business year is defined as the time when accounting started either because of obligations from the 
commercial register or because of first revenues. This does not necessarily correspond to the date of 
registration in the commercial register. 
The position generator (Lin and Dumin, 1986) uses the occupations of network members as 
an indicator of the access to valuable resources and information. The usefulness of this 
instrument hinges on the relative importance and relatedness of the individuals role to the 
type of start--up being created. For a biotech start--up, knowing bankers or a professor in 
biology may be more useful than knowing a poet; but this may be the opposite if an 
entrepreneur opens up a bookstore. Hence, this approach has limited value for studies not 
focusing on a single industry with a clear hierarchy of useful contacts.  
Therefore, we attempt to improve the measurement of social capital in the field of 
entrepreneurship by applying a more recently used measurement procedure, the resource 
generator, as developed by van der Gaag and Snijders (2005). This approach focuses on 
potential helpful flows of resources and asks typically a battery of questions such as: Do 
you know any people who can lend you 5,000€? The main advantage of this measurement 
concept is that it measures social capital at a ‘general’ base (van der Gaag and Snijders, 
2004), which refers to the possibility to access different, concrete and restricted sub 
domains of social capital. For our analysis, we adapt the methodology of the resource 
generator to concrete resource flows instead of potential resource flows, because our 
approach is based on the “use” of social capital rather than its mere existence.  
To quantify social capital use, we ask the entrepreneurs if they received advice, support or 
help from a third party, free or for less than the usual charge, during the venture creation 
process in nine different fields. These fields are derived from the nascent entrepreneurship 
literature (see Davidsson, 2006 for an overview), where important activities in the venture 
creation process, such as R&D, market exchange, financing and management, are 
addressed. We chose the items to cover the activities that are important to enable the 
business to get up and running, primarily focusing on the recognition and the exploitation 
of the business opportunity (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000).  
Table 5.1 displays our measures of social capital use. For solo entrepreneurs and the 
interviewee of a start--up team, we have at hand information on whether the advice, support 
or help came from the circle of the closest friends and family (strong ties) or from 
acquaintances (weak ties). Following the suggestions of Marsden and Campbell (1984), 
closeness or, in other words, emotional intensity serves as an indicator for the tie strength.5 
Note that, in the case of a new venture team, the interviewee was briefed not to report the 
help which he received from the other members of the team. We count only help from 
outside the new venture team. Consequently, the interviewee was asked whether his team 
members received advice and support at all from outside, regardless of whether the helpers 
counted as family, friends or acquaintances.6  
To verify the information of the interviewee, for a random sample of 55 cases the research 
team conducted an additional face--to--face interview with another member of the start--up 
team and received 42 matchable and usable responses. We performed dependent t--tests for 
paired samples on the equality of means concerning our main social capital variables, the 
overall social capital use (indicated by the number of fields with received advice) for the 
complete team (t= -0.48; p= 0.63) and the propensity to use any social capital in at least 
                                                 
5 In their seminal work, Marsden and Campbell (1984) identify educational differences, kinship and the fact 
that two persons work together as important predictors of tie strength. They suggest closeness or emotional 
intensity as the best available indicator for evaluating the strength of a tie. The majority of the empirical 
studies apply this concept (for an overview see Kim and Aldrich, 2005), either intentional or unintentional 
due to practical reasons, since this measurement procedure is easy to administer and straightforward. 
6 In the case of team founders, the distinction between weak and strong ties cannot be made, as the 
interviewee usually was not able to classify his cofounders’ contacts as weak or strong. Therefore, we only 
have information about tie strength concerning the interviewee of the new venture team. 
one field (t= -0.37; p= 0.71). The tests reveal no statistical differences in both cases, giving 
evidence for the reliability of our social capital variables.  
As suggested in the literature (e.g. Delmar and Gunnarson, 2000; Vivarelli, 2004), we also 
collected data on whether the entrepreneurs’ networks contained other managers and 
business owners (whether they provided support or not), whether the entrepreneur received 
public advice from public consulting agencies, and whether people provided 
encouragement or social support to start a business. These social capital variables serve as 
a standard of comparison to our measures of social capital use and are measured at the 
venture level (Table 5.1), with the exception of encouragement and social support. This 
variable is based on the interviewee only because the respective question for the other team 
members can hardly be answered by the interviewee in a reliable way. 
 
Table 5.1 and 5.2 near here  
 
As indicator for human capital variety, we use the variety of functional background of the 
entrepreneur(s), which is measured by the number of functional areas in which the founder 
(team) has prior work experience (Table 5.2). In the case of a new venture team, we count 
as team members all persons who were actively involved in the venture creation process 
and owned or had owned a part of the venture. Persons entering to and exiting from the 
team were also counted as team members. As additional indicators for human capital, we 
include at the venture level the number of team members, years of leadership experience, 
and prior entrepreneurial experience since, in similar studies, they have been found to have 
a significant impact on the development and performance of new ventures (Colombo and 
Grilli, 2005; Cooper et al., 1994; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990).  
To control for the effect of financial capital, we include the start--up capital in the first year 
of operation. Final controls refer to industry, the start--up year, the possible differences 
between industrial and service companies, and the innovativeness of the start--up. The 
descriptive statistics and correlation matrices are displayed for solo entrepreneurs and 
entrepreneurial teams separately in Tables 5.3 and 5.4 respectively. 
 





4.1 Do Solo Entrepreneurs and New Venture Teams Differ in the Use of Social 
Capital? 
 
We start with a test of Hypothesis 1: Do solo entrepreneurs and new venture teams differ in 
the use of social capital and, if so, in which fields? To answer this question, we distinguish 
between two cases. In the first, we compare the interviewees of the different modes of firm 
founding (solo start--up vs. team start--up), henceforth called the interviewee level. In the 
second case, we compare the solo start--up with the aggregate of all members of a team 
start--up, henceforth called the venture level. On the one hand, these comparisons are 
accomplished by using our measure for overall social capital use, representing the number 
out of nine fields in which social capital can be used, and by the propensity to use any 
social capital. On the other hand, we compare both start--up modes on the basis of the 
traditional social capital variables. We apply Wilcoxon--Man--Whitney and Chi--square 
tests in order to find differences in those counts and probabilities. 
 
Table 5.5 near here  
 
With respect to the interviewee level, we find (Table 5.5) that a solo entrepreneur uses, in 
general, more social capital than the interviewee of a team start--up. More precisely, the 
solo entrepreneur uses, with a probability of 76 per cent, any social capital and at the mean 
overall social capital in 3.0 fields compared to 68 per cent and 2.3 fields in the sub--sample 
of the interviewees of a team start--up. These differences are significant at least at the 5 per 
cent level. Looking at the traditional indicators of social capital, we find no statistically 
significant differences between the two modes of firm founding on the interviewee level.  
Concerning the venture level (Table 5.5), we find no statistically significant difference 
between solo start--ups (76 per cent; 3.0 fields) and team start--ups using any social capital 
in 73 per cent of the cases representing overall social capital use in 2.7 fields. Testing also 
for two of the three traditional indicators for social capital7 does not deliver significant 
differences between the solo and team responses.  
                                                 
7 Since we are operating at the venture level, we cannot perform a comparison with respect to the variables 
encouragement and social support, because we only possess these data for the interviewee member of the 
start--up team. 
To summarize, we find no support for Hypothesis 1 according to which solo entrepreneurs 
and new venture teams differ in their use of social capital.8 
 
4.2 The Effects of Social Capital 
 
Testing the effects of social capital on venture performance, we refer to hypotheses (H2) on 
overall social capital, (H3) on strong ties and (H4) on weak ties. Each of them is supposed 
to have a positive impact on new venture performance, as expressed in the absolute number 
of employees in the third year of firm operation. We run regressions for a sample 
containing all start--ups, including both solo and team start--ups. We again distinguish 
between two ways of representing team start--ups, namely the venture level and the 
interviewee level. As the dependent variable is a count variable and there is evidence for 
the presence of overdispersion, we use negative--binomial regression models for the 
following analyses. The regression results are displayed in the Models 1-3 in Table 5.6. 
Looking at the venture level in Model 1, overall social capital turns out to be insignificant. 
In Model 2 and Model 3, relying on variables at the interviewee level, we do not get 
significant coefficients for either individual overall social capital or for weak ties and 
strong ties. Furthermore, in all three models, the traditional social capital variables knowing 
other managers and business owners, encouragement and social support and public advice 
show no significant effects. Concerning human capital, we only find significant positive 
                                                 
8 Interestingly, this result holds for the traditional indicators of social capital. What empirically distinguishes 
these traditional indicators from the nine fields of used social capital is the fact that they occur with a much 
higher probability. Furthermore, the traditional indicators do not show the observed pattern with higher 
occurrence for a solo entrepreneur compared to the interviewee of a new venture team. This confirms our 
argument that traditional indicators can‘t disentangle social capital from team issues. 
effects for variety of functional background at the 1 per cent level. Concerning the controls, 
we find significantly positive effects for start--up capital at the 1 per cent level, as well as 
significant time and industry dummies. 
 
Table 5.6 near here  
 
Based on these results, we are forced to reject Hypotheses 2 to 4. This is quite an 
unexpected outcome and, combined with the unexpected result of no difference in using 
social capital between solo start--ups and entrepreneurial teams, leaves us with a puzzle. A 
solution to this puzzle may be found in analysing whether the two types of start--ups differ 
in their respective use of social capital. This may give some explanation for the results 
found so far. 
 
4.3 The Differential Use of Social Capital 
 
Looking at the way in which the two types of start--ups use social capital, as a dependent 
variable we use various binary measures for the general use of any social capital. As 
independent variables, we include the controls as well as one of the traditional social capital 
measures, knowing other managers and business owners. We start by analysing solo 
entrepreneurs.  
Table 5.7 provides the results of the logistic regression. Model 1 refers to solo 
entrepreneurs. We find knowing other managers and business owners to have a positive 
significant effect on the use of social capital at a level of 1 per cent. A significantly 
negative effect at the 1 per cent level is found for leadership experience. In addition, 
service companies are significantly more likely to use social capital, whereas more 
innovative ventures use significantly (at the 10 per cent level) less social capital. 
 
Table 5.7 near here 
 
Performing the same analyses for entrepreneurial teams, we run two models distinguishing 
between the venture level (Model 2 in Table 5.7) and the interviewee level (Model 3 in 
Table 5.7). For Models 2 and 3, as for solo entrepreneurs, knowing other managers and 
business owners shows up significantly positive at the 1 per cent level for entrepreneurial 
teams. At the venture level in Model 2, higher innovativeness and higher leadership 
experience contribute significantly to the usage of social capital in the complete team at the 
5 per cent and 10 per cent levels, respectively. The effect of the variety of functional 
background, however, is significantly negative at the 5 per cent level. The level of the 
interviewee in Model 3 reveals significantly positive effects from the number of team 
members (5 per cent) and the leadership experience (1 per cent).  
Comparing these two sets of results, we find major differences in using social capital 
between the two types of start-ups. Leadership experience reduces the use of social capital 
for solo entrepreneurs, but increases the use of social capital in start--up teams. For new 
venture teams only, a higher variety of functional background significantly reduces the use 
of social capital. In addition, the number of team members is positively correlated with the 
use of social capital in entrepreneurial teams.  
This difference in the way the use of social capital is determined between solo 
entrepreneurs and entrepreneurial teams is remarkable and unexpected given the existing 
literature on social capital. One may ask whether this can already be explained by 
significant differences among the two groups in some major features such as innovativeness 
or their assignment to certain industries and start--up years. However, Chi--square tests on 
equality and Wilcoxon--Mann--Whitney tests could not be rejected for innovativeness (χ2= 
1.27, p= 0.26), industry assignment (χ2= 0.66, p= 0.88), for service company (χ2= 0.94, p= 
0.76), for start--up year (χ2= 15.99, p= 0.45). The only difference between both start--up 
modes we find concerning the independent and control variables is the variety of functional 
background (z= -2.05, p= 0.04). Hence, we can conclude that the purpose of accessing 
social capital differs between solo entrepreneurs and entrepreneurial teams. For the former, 
it is rather a matter of whether the entrepreneur is convinced of mastering the task 
successfully as expressed by leadership experience. In entrepreneurial teams, the focus is 
rather on getting the portfolio of competences right, as expressed by the variety of 
functional background. 
 
4.4 The Differential Effect of Social Capital 
 
Based on these results, we now return to the first analysis of the effects of social capital on 
firm performance, as expressed in employment three years after foundation. We run 
regressions separately for the two types of venture founding and integrate an interaction 
term accounting for the manner in which social capital is used in both groups.  
Solo Entrepreneurs  
Table 5.6 (middle section) displays the results of negative binomial regressions. We 
distinguish between the case of social capital in general (Models 4 and 5) and the case of 
disaggregated social capital in terms of weak and strong ties (Models 6 and 7). Using 
identical controls in all four models, we find start--up capital and leadership experience to 
be significant predictors (at the 1 per cent level) of venture performance. The regressions 
also show significantly negative effects of entrepreneurial experience on venture success. 
This result is very unusual and can only be understood in light of the transformation 
process of Eastern Germany from a planned to a market economy (Fritsch, 2004). During 
this process starting from 1990, a considerable number of Western German entrepreneurs 
founded businesses in the eastern part of Germany. The data suggest that these western 
entrepreneurs more often failed than eastern entrepreneurs if they did not team up with 
people from the eastern part of Germany. It could be argued that these entrepreneurs lacked 
relationships with suppliers and critical contacts to access customers and were vulnerable in 
the face of fast--changing market conditions. Furthermore, western entrepreneurs often ran 
businesses in their home region to which they could easily return if the new businesses in 
Eastern Germany were about to fail.  
Looking at our hypotheses stating that (H2) overall social capital, (H3) weak ties and (H4) 
strong ties have a positive impact on new venture performance, we find only Hypothesis 3 
(Model 6) to be supported at the 5 per cent level. Insignificant coefficients for overall social 
capital (Model 4) as well as strong ties (Model 6) force me to reject Hypotheses 2 and 4. In 
contrast, the traditional social capital indicator variables, knowing other managers and 
business owners, encouragement and social support and public advice show no significant 
effects in all models.  
For a test of Hypotheses 5 and 6, suggesting moderating effects of the variety of functional 
background (H5) on the relationship between overall social capital and performance as 
well as (H6) on the relationship between weak ties and performance, we include respective 
interaction terms in Models 5 and 7 in Table 5.6. However, both hypotheses have to be 
rejected due to insignificant coefficients of the respective interaction terms.  
Entrepreneurial Teams  
Turning to entrepreneurial teams, Table 5.6 (right section) delivers the results of the 
negative binomial regressions. We distinguish again between the venture level in Models 8 
and 9 and the level of the interviewee in Models 10 and 11. As to the human capital 
variables, the results differ from those of the solo entrepreneurs: leadership experience and 
entrepreneurial experience are not essential for the success of entrepreneurial teams. 
Instead, team variety of functional background is highly significant at the 5 per cent level. 
With respect to the traditional social capital indicators, all results for solo entrepreneurs are 
confirmed: Knowing other managers and business owners, encouragement and social 
support and public advice all failed to show significant effects.  
Again, examining the hypotheses stating that (H2) overall social capital, (H3) strong ties 
and (H4) weak ties will have a positive impact on new venture performance, we find all 
hypotheses rejected (Models 8 and 10) due to insignificant coefficients. In contrast, the 
interaction term of variety of functional background × social capital in Model 9 is positive 
and highly significant at the 1 per cent level. Hence, the variety of functional background 
moderates the effect of team social capital on firm performance. This result is also found 
when looking at level of the interviewee (Model 11). Here again, the interaction term of 
variety of functional background × weak ties is significantly positive at the 5 per cent level. 
Hence, quite distinct from the evidence on solo entrepreneurs, we find here a moderating 
effect of the variety of functional background. Running an OLS regression instead of a 
negative binomial regression confirms these results, albeit at a lower level of significance 
of 10 per cent.  
We examine the impact of the variety of the functional background in more detail in Figure 
5.1.9 As illustrated in the left part of the figure, entrepreneurial teams which had a greater 
variety in their functional background enjoyed a higher employment level when employing 
social capital more often, supporting Hypothesis 5. This result holds if we focus on social 
capital in terms of weak ties (right part of Figure 5.1), supporting Hypothesis 6.10 
 
Figure 5.1 near here  
 
 
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
5.1 Interpretation and Discussion of the Results 
 
The study empirically examined the use of social capital among solo entrepreneurs 
and entrepreneurial teams in the venture creation process. Based on a sample of 456 start--
ups in innovative industries, we tried to answer two research questions: First, do 
                                                 
9 These figures are computed using the regression coefficient of a respective OLS--regression. 
10 The results do not hold true if we run a regression on the moderated effect of strong ties. In this case, the 
respective interaction term is insignificant. These regressions are not shown here, but are available from the 
author upon request. 
entrepreneurial teams more often use social capital than do solo entrepreneurs? Second, 
what are the effects of social capital use in the venture creation process on subsequent 
venture performance? Table 5.8 summarizes the results. 
 
Table 5.8 near here  
 
To answer the first question, we find that venture teams do not use more social capital than 
solo entrepreneurs in the venture creation process. This unexpected result is due to the fact 
that the two links explained below have reverse but quantitatively coequal impacts on 
social capital use.  
The standard proposition concerning the social capital issue is that a team start--up 
compared to a solo entrepreneur, or a larger team compared to a smaller team, has more 
social capital. This proposition is sometimes more explicitly (e.g. Colombo and Grilli, 
2005) made, but more often implicitly applied (e.g. Davidsson and Honig, 2003; van 
Gelderen et al., 2005). Its validity depends on how we define social capital. If we define 
social capital as the potential access to resources and information, the standard proposition 
holds true, because the number of team members will be positively correlated with the 
overall number of contacts and hence with the possible access to resources or information. 
When we, however, focus on the actual use of the network contacts, the proposition is at 
least questionable, if not unfounded. In a start--up team, its members combine their (often) 
different skills, abilities, information and resources, enabling them to perform more 
activities in the start--up process in--house. Hence, the actual use of social capital will be 
negatively correlated with the corresponding heterogeneity of the start--up team.  
Looking at the empirical results, we find evidence for both links affecting the use of social 
capital of new venture teams. First, team size is positively correlated with social capital use, 
suggesting that a new venture team compared to a solo entrepreneur as well as a larger team 
compared to smaller one has more contacts to use. Second, the variety of functional 
backgrounds in a team is negatively correlated with social capital use. This result suggests 
that the use of those contacts is interdependent on other characteristics of the entrepreneurs. 
Previous empirical literature has paid limited attention to that second link. The study by 
Renzulli and Aldrich (2005) is an exception and complements our results. They focus on 
the determinants of tie activation for business start--ups and find that heterogeneity within 
the social network of an entrepreneur significantly increases the probability of using those 
contacts for business purposes. In contrast to the present study, they evaluate the 
characteristics of network ties and the resulting impact on social capital use, while we are 
concerned with the characteristics of the team or solo entrepreneur and its impact on social 
capital use. In both cases, heterogeneity among actors is positively correlated with the use 
of social capital.  
Despite the evidence that new venture teams and solo entrepreneurs do not differ in their 
use of social capital, there are pronounced differences in the way in which both start--up 
modes use social capital in the venture creation process. We find that the human capital 
characteristics influencing social capital use are different for both groups. For solo 
entrepreneurs, there are clear indications of a substitutive relationship between human 
capital in terms of the leadership experience of the founder and social capital use. For start-
-up teams in contrast, no such clear relationship was found. Leadership experience 
positively correlates with social capital use. Team size and the variety of a team’s 
knowledgebase have reverse effects on social capital, as described above.  
Concerning the second question, we find that social capital use affects new venture 
performance differently for both start--up modes. The results of Section 4.4 lead to the 
conclusion that, for entrepreneurial teams, there are rather indirect effects of social capital 
use on firm performance moderated by the human capital variety. The more that teams are 
specialised in their functional background, the more the team members work with and learn 
from each other and the less they are on accessing social capital. A more diversified team 
complements the human capital available by increasingly relying on social capital. In 
contrast, for solo entrepreneurs, there appears to be a direct relationship of social capital on 
performance. The solo entrepreneurs profit from information provided by their weak ties. 
However, their human capital variety (variety of functional background) does not 
significantly contribute to any employment effects.  
The results of the analysis lead to the conclusion that solo start--ups and team start--ups 
differ beyond the pure number of entrepreneurs. Although the difference in the significance 
level of the interaction term between human capital and social capital variables is only 
indirect evidence, we argue that one of the key characteristics which differentiate solo 
entrepreneurs from entrepreneurial teams is the learning process. Thereby we understand 
the need for the development of necessary knowledge as effective in starting up and 
managing new ventures (Politis, 2005). This process is more complex for teams because, as 
they work together in the start--up project, they also learn together. Consider the case of a 
solo entrepreneur. He can directly evaluate information stemming from his personal 
contacts and integrate them into his knowledge base. By way of contrast, a member of a 
new venture team may not directly use such contacts. The entrepreneur will probably first 
ask his team members if he should approach his personal contact for help or information. 
Thereafter, the team members together probably consult this outside help and then evaluate 
together the usefulness of the information and their further actions.  
This supposed model fits well to the data and to the description the entrepreneurs gave 
during the interviews. We suppose that, for a team which has a broad knowledge base, it is 
more likely that they opt against help from the outside. However, if such a team indeed uses 
social capital, it profits considerably from the information transfer as a result of two 
mechanisms. First, their learning and evaluation procedure enables them to detect more 
valuable information. Second, because of the breadth of their knowledge base, they can 
more efficiently integrate and exploit the new knowledge. This view of organizational 
learning and the importance of a diverse knowledge base are in line with recent studies (e.g. 
Hayton and Zahra, 2005) on venture teams. 
 
5.2 Implications for Practice 
 
This study has several implications for practice. For those who have chosen to start up 
alone, access to novel information about markets, prices and competitors is of critical 
importance. This information is best accessed via weak ties, which includes (former) 
colleagues, friends and former employers, as well as people at conferences and trade fairs. 
We find that help, advice or support from those weak ties has positive effects on venture 
performance. In contrast, help from the circle of the closest friends and family members do 
not appear to have measurable effects on performance. Entrepreneurs may value trusted 
feedback from such sources highly, but the information lacks breadth and scope.  
For those who have chosen to team up with other people to start a venture, our implications 
are somewhat counterintuitive. We observe a high level of human capital in the new 
venture teams. On average, in four out of six predefined categories the team as a whole 
benefits from the work experience of its members. Such teams with a high variety of skills 
tend not to use their contacts, instead relying heavily on the knowledge base within the 
start--up team. However, these teams would gain the most from really using their network 
contacts. It seems that these teams have several advantages compared to less--equipped 
teams. First, they can better evaluate information from outside concerning their usefulness. 
Second, they probably have a choice of different helpers, leading to higher quality of the 
help. 
 
5.3 Implications for Theory 
 
The results have one particular implication for entrepreneurship theory, by contributing to 
the discussion concerning the nature of an entrepreneurial team. What is an entrepreneurial 
team? Is it just the leading entrepreneur dominating? Is it the sum of its parts? Is it more or 
rather something different than the sum of its parts? This question is of crucial importance 
for the understanding of entrepreneurship, since a substantial share of new venture projects 
are started by teams. The answer to that question given by the research community has 
changed over recent decades.  
The trait approach treated the entrepreneur as a lonely hero and mainly paid attention to the 
psychological characteristics of the single actor (for an overview see Gartner, 1988). The 
entrepreneurial team was not part of the research agenda. Over the past few years, the 
majority of the research has used the venture as the level of analysis (Davidsson and 
Wiklund, 2001). Team--related variables are often treated by summing the individual 
responses of the entrepreneurs. In our view, this is progress because it at least accepts the 
existence of the new venture team. However, studies focusing on team issues in 
entrepreneurship are scarce - with some notable exceptions (e.g. Chandler et al., 2005; 
Chowdhurry, 2005). These studies find evidence that the internal team processes such as 
communication, co--labouring and common decision--making are important predictors for 
team success. This contradicts the view that teams are purely the sum of their parts, but 
does not answer the question of whether the team is more than the sum of its parts or 
different from them.  
We find interaction effects between human and social capital variables for team start--ups 
but not for solo start--ups, suggesting that the team start--ups are something different than 
the sum of their parts. We argue that this interaction effect stems from collective work and 
information--sharing between the team members in the venture creation process, fostering 
learning at the individual and collective level. Our view is supported by research on teams 
operating in a range of contexts, such as primary care teams (Bunniss and Kelly, 2008), 
new product development teams (Bourgeon, 2007) and multidisciplinary working teams in 
the oil and gas industry (van der Vegt and Bunderson, 2005). All these studies emphasize 
the roles of collective work and information--sharing in the learning process of a team.  
In the field of entrepreneurship, some work has already been done concerning collective 
cognition (West, 2007; Shepherd and Krueger, 2002; Ensley and Pearce, 2001). For 
example, West (2007, p. 83) argues that in team start--ups ‘decisions are not left up to the 
individual’. Instead, often the team makes the decision. For West, it is important to 
understand how the individual perspectives of the entrepreneurs on the strategy translate 
into a collective understanding triggering collective decision and action. His model of 
collective cognition contains the individual cognition of the team members, as well as team 
internal processes and the environment external to the team.  
As Weick and Roberts (1993) suggest, we want to emphasize that we use the word 
collective instead of group, because we do not think that the team members merge into one 
group and we neither deny the existence and importance of the individuals nor the 
collective. Both levels - the individual as well as the collective - are present in an 
entrepreneurial team. Thus, research combining the individual and the collective level 
should yield valuable results for entrepreneurship. Future research may address in more 
detail how individual skills and individual social network contacts translate into the 
knowledge base of the emerging venture and which factors, such as communication and 





Our analysis naturally has its limitations. First and most important, the study is 
retrospective in nature. Although we use the above--described techniques to gain reliable 
information about the venture creation process from the entrepreneur, we cannot 
completely rule out memory decay and hindsight bias. In one extreme case, there was a 
time span of 20 years from the first steps into the venture creation process until the 
interview. Second, we use self--reported measure of the number of employees as a 
dependent variable. The results, thus, suffer from the self--report bias. However, we 
checked for the reliability of the data using secondary information of a business 
information provider. Market value of the start--up or turnover would be more appropriate 
dependent variables, which unfortunately are inaccessible for the present dataset consisting 
of very young and small enterprises. Third, concerning the independent variables, we also 
relied on information of only one member of a start--up team. We checked the reliability of 
the respondent information by interviewing an additional member of the entrepreneurial 
team. Regardless of whether these efforts confirm the overall reliability of our social capital 
use variables, we still lack disaggregated information on the use of weak and strong ties for 
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Social capital use 
Strong ties 
(Interviewee) 
We asked the solo-entrepreneur or the interviewee of a start-up team if he received help, support 
or advice from a third party free or for less than the usual charge during the venture creation 
process. More precisely we asked: How many people from the circle of the closest friends and 
family members ... 
1) ... have helped to write the business plan? 2) ... have supported the project with experience in 
the specific industry? 3) ... have conveyed contacts to potential customers? 4) ... brought 
knowledge and experience needed for the development of products and services? 5) ... brought 
knowledge and experience needed for producing products / delivering services? 6) ... have 
helped the project with contacts to potential investors and lenders? 7) ... have helped in 
marketing and promotion? 8) ... have helped the project with their contacts to the 
administration and policy or their reputation? 9) ... have helped by the refinement of the 
business idea? 
However, we do not use the mere amount of received advice. Instead, dummy variables for 
each field were created, indicating whether the entrepreneurs use social capital at all. The 




Count of fields with received help support or advice (same procedure as with strong ties) from the 
circle of acquaintances. Acquaintances were defined as people the entrepreneur knew and could 
have talked to when meeting on the street. 
Overall social capital 
(Interviewee) 
Count of fields with received help support or advice (same procedure as with strong ties) from 
either the circle of acquaintances or the circle of the closest friends and family members.  
Overall social capital 
(Team) 
In the case of a start-up team, we additionally asked the interviewee if the other team members 
received help, support or advice from a third party in the nine respective fields. To ensure 
answerability of the questions, these are only binary items of whether the other members used 
social capital. The measure of overall social capital is an aggregation of the help received by 
the interviewee and the other team members. We compute for overall social capital the count of 
fields with received help, support or advice across all members of the start-up team. 
Any social capital 
(Interviewee) 
Dummy: 1=Use of social capital in any of the nine different categories; otherwise=0; data at the 
interviewee level. 
Any social capital 
(Team) 
Dummy: 1=Use of social capital across all members of the start-up team in any of the nine 
different categories; otherwise=0.  




Dummy: 1=Knowing other managers and business owners from the first steps into the venture 
creation process until the start of the first business year; otherwise=0; data at the venture level. 
Encouragement and 
social support 
Dummy: 1=Received encouragement and social support in the venture creation process until the 
start of the first business year; otherwise=0, data at the interviewee level. 
Public advice Dummy: 1=Received advice from public institutions for different activities in the venture creation 
process until the start of the first business year; otherwise=0; data at the venture level. 
 
 




Number of team 
members 
Count of all team members who were actively involved in the venture creation process until the 




Count of categories with working experience prior the first steps into the venture creation process 
across all team members (Six categories: 1=Management, 2=Marketing/Sales/Promotion, 
3=Accounting/Controlling/Financing, 4=Engineering/R&D, 5=Production, 6=Personnel); data 
at the venture level. 
Leadership 
experience 
Count of years with experience in executive positions prior the first steps into the venture creation 
process across all team members; data at the venture level. 
Entrepreneurial 
experience 
Count of companies (registered in the commercial register) prior to the first steps into the venture 
creation process across all team members; data at the venture level. 
Others 
Service company Dummy: 1=Company offers mainly services; otherwise=0. 
Innovativeness Dummy: 1=Conducting R&D in the venture creation phase and the first three years of business 
was a major activity for the start-up; otherwise=0. 
Start-up capital Financial capital (equity + debt) at the start of the first business year, Categorical variable: 
1=1,000 euros or less, 2= 1,000 euros till 9,999 Euro, 3= 10,000 euros till 49,999 euros, 4= 
50,000 euros till 99,999 euros, 5= 100,000 euros till 249,999 euros, 6= 250,000 euros till 
499,999 euros, 7=more than 500,000 euros. 
Time dummies Start-up year, 4 dummy variables: 1) start-up prior to 1994, 2) start-up between 1994 and 1997, 3) 
start-up between 1998 and 2000, 4) start-up between 2000 and 2006. 
Industry dummies NACE, 1-digit: 1) Chemical industry, metalworking industry, engineering, 2) Electrical 
engineering, fine mechanics, optics, 3) Information and communication technology, R&D, 
services, 4) Miscellaneous. 
 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics and Intercorrelation Matrix for Solo Entrepreneurs 
Note: Correlation coefficients displayed in bold are significant at the 5% level.  
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
(1) Number. of employees 3rd year - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
(2) Overall social capital (Interviewee) .00 - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
(3) Any social capital (Interviewee) .05 .67 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
(4) Weak ties (Interviewee) .09 .78 .51 - - - - - - - - - - - 
(5) Strong ties (Interviewee) -.09 .59 .38 .04 - - - - - - - - - - 
(6) Knowing other managers and business owners .02 .26 .26 .19 .16 - - - - - - - - - 
(7) Encouragement and social support .05 .41 .34 .26 .33 .24 - - - - - - - - 
(8) Public advice .12 .21 .07 .25 .03 -.06 .13 - - - - - - - 
(9) Variety of functional background .04 -.05 .02 .06 -.15 .07 -.07 -.00 - - - - - - 
(10) Leadership experience .28 -.11 -.25 .04 -.15 -.02 -.13 .03 .28 - - - - - 
(11) Entrepreneurial experience -.07 .07 .04 .11 -.05 -.03 -.06 -.10 .11 .15 - - - - 
(12) Service company -.14 .19 .25 .12 .12 .20 -.04 .02 -.05 -.21 .04 - - - 
(13) Innovativeness -.01 -.10 -.20 -.07 -.05 -.07 -.09 .03 .09 .19 .12 -.12 - - 
(14) Start-up capital .23 -.05 -.01 -.02 -.04 -.06 -.10 .12 .17 .13 .08 -.22 .13 - 
 Mean 6.77 2.98 0.76 2.02 1.36 0.58 0.52 0.42 3.02 6.73 0.18 0.48 0.29 3.18
 SD 11.56 2.45 0.43 2.18 2.01 0.50 0.50 0.50 1.74 7.67 0.48 0.50 0.45 1.40
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics and Intercorrelation Matrix for Entrepreneurial Teams 
 
  Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17)
(1) Number of employees 3rd year - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
(2) Overall social capital (Team) .04 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
(3) Overall social capital (Interviewee) .05 .91 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
(4) Any social capital (Team) -.10 .66 .60 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
(5) Any social capital (Interviewee) -.06 .66 .69 .89 - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
(6) Weak ties (Interviewee) .04 .78 .84 .50 .57 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
(7) Strong ties (Interviewee) .03 .50 .61 .34 .38 .08 - - - - - - - - - - - 
(8) Knowing other managers and business owners -.01 .41 .41 .33 .36 .33 .26 - - - - - - - - - - 
(9) Encouragement and social support .10 .36 .35 .24 .24 .30 .20 .34 - - - - - - - - - 
(10) Public advice -.07 .10 .13 .13 .14 .12 .07 -.00 -.00 - - - - - - - - 
(11) Number of team members -.03 .05 .05 .05 .07 .07 -.02 .07 .05 .05 - - - - - - - 
(12) Variety of functional background .14 .04 .04 -.07 -.04 .01 .07 .04 -.12 -.12 .11 - - - - - - 
(13) Leadership experience .07 .08 .12 .06 .08 .14 .00 .06 .07 .07 .32 .32 - - - - - 
(14) Entrepreneurial experience .01 -.01 -.04 -.04 -.02 .01 -.08 -.03 -.14 -.14 .28 .28 .39 - - - - 
(15) Service company -.05 -.01 .02 -.03 -.02 .01 .02 .06 -.05 -.05 -.15 -.09 -.03 -.05 - - - 
(16) Innovativeness .00 .09 .05 .04 .05 .02 .06 -.03 .09 .03 .16 .10 .03 .08 -.15 -  
(17) Start-up capital .32 .04 .04 -.02 .01 .05 .00 .01 .07 .07 .06 .23 .18 .17 -.13 .18 - 
 Mean 9.12 2.71 2.30 0.73 0.68 1.74 0.80 0.61 0.52 0.44 2.77 4.33 16.81 1.13 0.49 0.34 3.31
 SD 14.84 2.51 2.32 0.45 0.47 2.12 1.46 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.90 1.64 17.74 1.78 0.50 0.47 1.34













Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test a 
Chi-square test b 
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2.920 (0.004) *** 
1.244 (0.210) 






4.167 (0.041) ** 
0.800 (0.371) 
Social capital traditional     
Knowing other managers 



























Number of observations 
 
182 274  
Note: a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test on overall social capital use with prob > |t| in parentheses; b Chi-square test 
any social capital use and on social capital traditional with prob > |z| in parentheses; c data in first row on 
interviewee level (IL), data in second row on the venture level (VL), for solo entrepreneurs both levels are 
identical; d encouragement and social support is based on the interviewees response only; *** (**,*) denotes a 
significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). 
 
 
 Table 6: The Effect of Social Capital Use 
 Dependent variable: Number of employees in the third year of operation 
All start-up projects  
Solo entrepreneurs 
 Entrepreneurial teams 
Venture level  Interviewee level   Venture level  Interviewee level 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Social capital use            
Social capital (Team) 0.01 ----- ----- ----- -----  ----- ----- 0.03 -0.02 ----- -----  
Social capital (Interviewee) ----- 0.03 ----- 0.10 0.10  ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----  
Weak ties (Interviewee) ----- ----- 0.03 ----- -----  0.18** 0.16** ----- ----- 0.01 -0.02  
Strong ties (Interviewee) ----- ----- -0.06 ----- -----  -0.12 -0.11 ----- ----- 0.02 0.02 
Social capital traditional            
Knowing other managers and 
business owners 0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.05 -0.05  -0.05 -0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 
Encouragement and social support 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.04  0.05 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.70 
Public advice 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.09 0.09  0.05 0.05 -0.09 -0.10 -0.09 -0.10  
Human capital and controls            
Number of team members 0.03 0.04 0.02 ----- -----  ----- ----- -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02  
Variety of functional background 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.04 0.05  0.01 0.02 0.18*** 0.17** 0.17** 0.16** 
Leadership experience 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.27*** 0.27 *** 0.24*** 0.24*** -0.09 -0.08 -0.08 -0.06  
Entrepreneurial experience -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.15** -0.15 ** -0.17** -0.17** -0.07 -0.06 -0.07 -0.06  
Service company 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.02  -0.01 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.07 
Innovativeness -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.08 -0.07  -0.06 -0.05 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03  
Start-up capital 0.32*** 0.32*** 0.33*** 0.24*** 0.25 *** 0.25*** 0.26*** 0.38*** 0.39*** 0.38*** 0.38*** 
Time/Industry dummies Yes/Yes  Yes/Yes Yes/Yes  No/Yes No/Yes  No/Yes No/Yes Yes/Yes Yes/Yes Yes/Yes Yes/Yes  
Interaction terms              
Variety of functional background x 
Overall social capital ----- 
 ----- -----  ----- 0.12  ----- ----- ----- 0.15*** ----- -----  
Variety of functional background x 
Weak ties (Interviewee) ----- 
 ----- -----  ----- -----  ----- 0.08 ----- ----- ----- 0.14** 
Constant 1.97***  1.97*** 1.97***  1.72*** 1.72 *** 1.70*** 1.70*** 2.05*** 2.03*** 2.05*** 2.05*** 
Chi2 108.8  109.0 110.9  67.60 69.63  74.27 75.18 74.56 81.12 74.57 80,13 
Pseudo R2 0.04  0.04 0.04  0.06 0.06  0.07 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05 
Number of observations 456  456 456  182 182  182 182 274 274 274 274 
Note: Negative binomial regression;  *** (**,*) denotes a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). 
  
Table 7: The Differential Use of Social Capital  
 Dependent variable: Any social capital use 
 Solo entrepreneurs  Entrepreneurial teams 
   Venture level Interviewee level 
 (1)  (2)       (3) 
Social capital traditional     
Knowing other managers and business 
owners 
0.601 ***  0.841 *** 0.861 *** 
Human capital and controls     
Number of team members -----   -0.088  0.325 ** 
Variety of functional background 0.221   -0.360 ** -0.054  
Leadership experience -0.592 ***  0.330 * 0.322 * 
Entrepreneurial experience 0.211   -0.125  -0.334  
Service company 0.496 **  -0.135  0.244  
Innovativeness -0.379 *  0.428 ** 0.172  
Start-up capital 0.144   -0.067  0.115  
Time/Industry dummies No/No   No/No  No/No  
Constant 1.453 ***  1.234 *** -1.537 *** 
Chi2 35.701   47.673  41.487  
Pseudo R2 0.182   0.148  0.142  
Number of observations 182   274  274  
 Note: Logistic regressions;  *** (**,*) denotes a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). 
 
 
 Table 8: Summary of Results 
 Results 





H1: Solo entrepreneurs and entrepreneurial 
teams differ in social capital use  Supported 
H2: Overall social capital positive for 
performance 
Not supported Not supported Not supported 
H3: Strong ties positive for performance Not supported Not supported Not supported 
H4: Weak ties positive for performance Not supported Supported Not supported 
H5: Human capital variety moderating the 
effect of overall social capital on 
performance 
Not tested Not supported Supported 
H6: Human capital variety moderating the 








Figure 1: The Moderating Effect of Teams’ Variety of Functional Background 
 
 
 
 
